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Abstract 
 
The concept of the New Environmental Politics of Urban Development (NEPUD) examines 
the impact of international and national environmental regulation on the politics of urban 
development. The NEPUD concept emerged from case studies of environmental governance 
in entrepreneurial cities. However, little is known about the concept’s relevance for less 
competitive cities, especially urban centres facing profound problems associated with 
economic decline, social deprivation and negative external images or ‘structurally 
disadvantaged cities.’ This paper examines how the NEPUD has played out within two 
structurally disadvantaged maritime port cities in Northern Europe, Hull (UK) and 
Bremerhaven (Germany). Both cities face serious social and economic challenges associated 
with long-term industrial decline, such as high unemployment rates, low skill levels, 
economic peripherality, and poor external images. Nevertheless, new opportunities opened up 
by climate change and the green economy have prompted political actors in Hull and 
Bremerhaven to build new alliances between local government, business and civil society and 
enhance governance capacities on climate change and green urban development. Highlighting 
similarities and differences between these two places, the paper reveals how climate change 
regulations provide opportunities for certain structurally disadvantaged cities to attract ‘green 
jobs’ and transform their external image.  
 
Key words: climate change, green economy, urban politics, place image, structurally 
disadvantaged cities    
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1. Introduction 
 
Across Europe and North America, the negotiation of international agreements on climate 
change and reductions in carbon emissions is transforming the politics of urban development, 
creating both challenges as well as opportunities for city governments, business and civic 
organisations, and a range of other urban political actors. Such actors are striving – albeit 
with mixed success – to reconcile mainstream economic development activities (e.g. 
attracting inward investment, supporting urban redevelopment, and improving infrastructure) 
with strategies to mitigate for climate change and reduce carbon emissions. Typical of these 
urban climate change strategies are: making infrastructure more resilient to sea level rise and 
flooding; reducing reliance on carbon intensive energy; developing jobs in ‘green’ sectors of 
the economy; and investing in low carbon transportation alternatives. As cities come to terms 
with the challenges of climate change, moreover, they are finding new ways of marketing and 
rebranding themselves as, variously, ‘green,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘carbon neutral,’ ‘smart,’ and/or 
‘resilient.’ In short, climate change is transforming the politics of urban development in 
potentially far-reaching ways, suggesting the need to apply new theoretical ideas and 
concepts to the realm of urban development politics.  
Emerging from the geographical literature on urban sustainability and environmental 
governance (see, for instance, Gibbs and Jonas, 2000; Krueger and Gibbs, 2007; Bulkeley 
and Kern 2006; Kern and Bulkeley 2009), the New Environmental Politics of Urban 
Development (NEPUD) is one such concept (Jonas et al. 2011). The NEPUD concept does 
not attempt to identify ideal types of urban climate governance. Instead, it seeks to 
understand the manner in which broader environmental regulatory processes (e.g. 
international agreements on climate change and carbon emissions) encourage or steer 
political actors in different urban places towards environmentally benign or ‘green’ forms of 
urban development alongside, or in addition to, more conventional economic development 
strategies (e.g. competing for inward investment).  Material and discursive strategies 
emerging around ‘green’ urban development are not only empowering new strategic alliances 
within urban governance but also encouraging new ways of marketing cities as greener, more 
environmentally sustainable places (Jonas and While, 2007). Nevertheless, cities facing 
profound economic and social challenges continue to struggle to find a political balance 
between implementing climate change policies and reducing carbon emissions, on the one 
hand, and promoting economic development and sustaining social provision, on the other. 
We know surprisingly little about how such a political balance is achieved – if at all – in 
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different cities operating within different national and international environmental regulatory 
contexts. 
The NEPUD concept was developed from empirical studies of entrepreneurial cities in 
Europe (e.g. Barcelona) and the USA (e.g. Seattle) (Jonas et al. 2011; Jonas and While, 
2007). Although it was assumed to have much wider applicability, the NEPUD concept has 
yet to be applied to cities faced with profound economic, social and environmental challenges 
or ‘structurally disadvantaged cities.’ We use this terminology differently to that of 
‘structurally disadvantaged communities,’ a term which has appeared in studies of crime and 
poverty in inner cities in the United States (US) (Wilson,1987; Kane, 2005). The latter term 
seeks to capture the effects of social structures (e.g. race and class) on the economic and 
social marginalisation of minority populations in inner-city communities. In contrast, the 
former term, ‘structurally disadvantaged cities,’ can be applied to small-to-medium sized 
cities in Europe grappling with problems of structural economic decline, mounting social 
problems, and negative external images.  
Two examples of such structurally disadvantaged cities are the once-thriving maritime 
port cities of Hull (UK) and Bremerhaven (Germany), both of which suffer from: 
 long term decline of maritime-related industries (e.g. fishing and shipbuilding);  
 disused industrial assets and infrastructures (e.g. port facilities); 
 geographical remoteness or economic ‘peripherality’;  
 high unemployment, low/underutilised skills base and declining populations;  
 poor external image and marketing; 
 weak economic governance structures, shrinking tax bases, and susceptibility to 
austerity measures and/or state-imposed efforts to achieve balanced budgets. 
The paper assesses how Bremerhaven and Hull have tried to turn at least some of the above-
listed structural disadvantages into opportunities by adopting urban governance measures 
and/or facilitating business and societal activities on climate change, renewable energy, and 
investment in green port facilities.1  
 The research addressed the following three main questions: How are international and 
national climate change policies driving the urban development strategies and policies of 
structurally disadvantaged cities? What political and other trade-offs are involved in the move 
towards a green economy in such places?  Do similar structurally disadvantaged cities 
respond to climate change in the same or different ways as evidenced by their efforts to 
develop the green economy and engage in place promotion strategies? In attempting to 
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answer these questions this paper will provide empirical evidence for how the NEPUD 
concept could be applied to a category of cities that has tended to be overlooked in the 
literature on urban climate change governance, namely, structurally disadvantaged maritime 
port cities.  
 To anticipate some of our findings, both Bremerhaven and Hull exemplify the 
potential opportunities for certain structurally disadvantaged cities to undertake new 
governance and place-promotion initiatives around climate change and the green economy. 
Such initiatives portend a possible reversal in the otherwise dire economic prospects 
confronting these particular cities (as well as others facing broadly similar challenging 
circumstances). Building on a well-established renewable energy cluster, Bremerhaven’s 
local authorities have retrofitted the city’s port facilities for offshore wind turbine assembly 
and begun to market the city as ‘Klimastadt’ (Climate City). More than a place branding 
strategy, Klimastadt has also led to institutional reorganisations within urban government. In 
a similar fashion, urban political actors in Hull have overseen significant economic 
transformations around investments in the green economy. However, climate change is not so 
central to how the City of Hull and the wider Humber region (in which Hull is situated) are 
being marketed and rebranded. Instead, taking advantage of the prospect of new investments 
in green port facilities, the Humber is being reimagined as the UK’s ‘renewable energy 
capital’ alongside, yet separately from, Hull’s ‘city of culture’ strategy. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of the 
literature on climate change and urban development politics, the main substantive sections of 
the paper compare and contrast recent transformations in the institutions, alliances and 
images of Bremerhaven and Hull, respectively. Despite substantive progress on developing 
the green economy and addressing climate change, both cities continue to face significant 
social and cultural challenges, which have resulted in strategic compromises in how these 
structurally disadvantaged cities are being reorganised and reimagined, economically, 
socially and also culturally. In the conclusion, we suggest that future research on the NEPUD 
could benefit from the analysis of a broader sample of structurally disadvantaged cities, 
which makes use of a comparative perspective on urban environmental governance. 
 
2. Climate change, the green economy and the politics of urban development 
 
Since the 1970s, the scope of international and national environmental regulation has 
reached into many spheres of urban politics and policy in North America and Europe (Jonas 
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et al. 2004; While et al. 2010). Focusing here on Europe, many climate change-induced 
regulations occur at the European Union (EU) and international level. These include the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement as well as the EU’s 1989 burden sharing 
agreement and 2008 effort sharing decision, which allocated to EU member states 
differentiated greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) reduction targets derived from the EU’s 
agreed reduction targets. Under the 1998 EU burden sharing agreement the UK and Germany 
accepted reduction targets of 12.5 and 21 percent respectively by 2012. In 2008 the EU’s ‘20-
20-20 by 2020’ energy and climate package put forward a unilateral 20 per cent (and a 
conditional 30 per cent) reduction target by 2020. Additionally, it included a 20 per cent 
target for renewable energy and the goal to increase energy efficiency by 20 per cent. The 
EU’s effort sharing decision then allocated to the UK and Germany CO2 emission reduction 
targets of 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively by 2020 (compared to 2005) (Wurzel, 
Connelly and Liefferink 2017). In 2014 the EU agreed to a 40 per cent reduction of GHGE 
and an increase of renewable energy to 27 per cent by 2030. By 2050 the EU aims to reduce 
GHGE between 80 to 90 per cent (compared to 1990) (EU Commission 2015). Such targets 
require action at various levels of climate governance including the international, EU, 
national and, as we emphasise here, the urban scale.  The UK and Germany have both also 
adopted national GHGE reduction targets which are more ambitions than the EU’s 2020 and 
2030 targets. Importantly Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power thus making the 
targets for renewable energy especially urgent.2  The outcome of UK’s EU membership 
referendum in favour of leaving the EU (so-called Brexit) has thrown into doubt Britain’s 
continued commitment to climate policies as agreed by the EU and its member states.3  
Nonetheless, in November 2016 the UK government under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Theresa May ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement as negotiated by the EU and its member 
states.  
The landscape of urban development in the EU thus can be characterised by a high 
degree of inter-scalar governance with respect to climate change and carbon reduction 
measures (Gibbs and Jonas 2000; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; While et al. 2010). At the same 
time, many cities are faced with austerity and intensified inter-urban competition for 
investment. Responding to these different pressures, economic development practitioners in 
many cities have rallied around the ‘green economy’ (e.g. investments in renewable 
industries such as the manufacture of wind turbines) as a means for both promoting inward 
investment and transforming the urban economy around sectors often regarded to be more 
environmentally benign than, for instance, traditional fossil-fuel industries (Gibbs 2002; 
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Christopherson 2010). However, there is little consensus about what ‘green’ economic 
development entails for urban governance – nor agreement about how it should be 
implemented in different places. Whilst some advocates argue that any climate change-driven 
urban economic agenda must be built around social justice and resilience, others believe that 
new regulations, technologies and government incentives are sufficient to produce green 
economic development and jobs locally (see Christopherson 2010: 371). And if the creation 
of ‘green jobs’ may offer distributional benefits to some workers in some cities, it might not 
politically empower labour as a class nationally or internationally so much as enrol local 
workforces in divisive inter-urban competition (Deutz 2014). Furthermore, it is not clear how 
the green economy should be promoted locally alongside other mainstream place promotion 
strategies. Given these different and sometimes conflicting perspectives, it is necessary to 
examine more closely how the climate change agenda in practice comes to ground at the 
urban scale and assess the manner in which it is integrated (or not, as the case may be) with 
other arenas and priorities within urban politics.   
In order to address this challenge, the concept of the NEPUD has been proposed as a 
way of highlighting the growing centrality of climate change, carbon control and green 
economic development in discourses, strategies and struggles around urban development and 
place promotion (Jonas et al. 2011).  In particular, the NEPUD takes account of the political 
trade-offs involved in promoting green urban development versus mainstream economic 
development strategies. However, its relevance here is not simply in examining whether 
climate change is shaping how urban political actors assess the costs and benefits of inter-
urban competition but also whether efforts to green urban economic development are 
empowering new strategic alliances in urban politics and shaping urban place promotion 
strategies.  Despite the growing importance of climate change in urban politics, urban leaders 
across Europe continue to address many other political demands and pressures with respect to 
economic development and satisfying social needs in the urban living place. The green 
economy does offer an attractive answer to some of these demands and pressures for some 
places; but not for every place. For example, the switch to a low-carbon green economy is 
likely to involve negotiations and trade-offs around inward investment and job creation, on 
the one hand, and collective social provision (e.g. affordable housing, schools, etc.), on the 
other (Jonas et al. 2011). How these trade-offs take place in structurally disadvantaged cities 
– places that were once heavily reliant upon traditional resource-consuming economic sectors 
such as the shipbuilding, food processing and fishing industries – is not well documented.  
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Based on studies of entrepreneurial cities, the integration of environmental agendas 
within urban governance can be relatively non-conflictual especially in localities that are well 
endowed with fiscal resources, promote strong environmental sustainability agendas in local 
politics, and participate in wider environmental networks (Jonas et al. 2004; While et al. 
2004). Indeed, policy innovations in response to climate change, such as green building 
policies, are increasingly likely to be adopted by cities rather than nation states (Cidell 2015). 
However, one might expect this to be less typical of structurally disadvantaged cities, many 
of which are faced with severe economic and social problems, where environmental 
sustainability is low on the political agenda compared to social and economic regeneration, 
and linkages to wider environmental policy networks are weak or altogether absent. 
Moreover, growing fiscal constraints in such cities – often imposed by central government − 
forces urban leaders to opt for short-term measures and rhetorical gestures in response to 
climate change. Since the 2008 financial crisis many former industrial cities in Europe face 
state-induced austerity measures, greater public spending controls, and outright fiscal 
retrenchment. Whilst some of these cities continue to struggle to attract investment, others 
still hope to capitalise upon new economic opportunities opening up around climate change 
and the green economy. For a few places the prospect of attracting ‘green jobs’ is seductive, 
especially given the lack of alternatives, but it nevertheless still requires the development of 
new urban alliances and governance capacities (Christopherson 2010; Rice 2010; Monaghan 
et al. 2013).  
In this context, differences between cities in terms of their inherited social, economic 
and political structures, as well as in respect of local-national relations within the state (as 
well as local-EU relations), creates opportunities for some places to attract ‘green jobs’ but 
not others. Indeed, such differences could lead to significant national variations in climate 
change governance arrangements at the urban scale (Jonas et al. 2011). For example, German 
federalism as enshrined in the constitution guarantees local self-governance (kommunale 
Selbstverwaltung), and leads to different local governance structures in different German 
states (Länder). Whilst in the UK there has been some devolution of powers to cities (e.g. 
City Deals and the 2001 Localism Act), this is occurring in context of state-imposed 
austerity. Likewise, German local governments’ room for manoeuvre has been curtailed by 
reforms to local government taxes, budgetary pressures and federal government imposed debt 
limits. Europeanisation in the form of the liberalisation of public utilities has also been 
blamed for reducing local governments’ climate change policy capabilities (Wollmann 
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2012).4 Consequently, pronounced Anglo-German local governance differences which once 
existed have narrowed in recent years (Bulkeley and Kern 2006). 
In both the UK and Germany, therefore, urban managers and politicians have to find 
new ways of working locally with the private sector and civil society to develop strategies on 
climate change and the green economy. In the next three sections, we examine, firstly, the 
social and economic challenges faced by Hull and Bremerhaven respectively, secondly, how 
each city has developed new alliances and strategies to develop the green economy and, 
thirdly, accompanying attempts to transform the external image of each city in turn.  
 
3. Attracting ‘green collar’ jobs: the challenges facing two structurally disadvantaged 
cities 
 
Hull - a city of c. 259,000 inhabitants in 2015, located on the Humber Estuary in 
North East England - is part of the Humber economic region (population c. 921,000) 
(Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 2017). This region includes the City of Hull, East 
Riding of Yorkshire, North Lincolnshire and North East Lincolnshire. Hull’s population has 
declined since it peaked at around 302,000 in 1931, falling to below 244,000 in 2001; it has 
been moderately reversed since 2013 in part due to net in-migration from countries in the EU 
(Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 2017; Interview, public official Hull, 2014). Hull has 
many of the economic and social attributes of a structurally disadvantaged city. It has 
undergone severe long term industrial decline in the fishing and other maritime-associated 
industries. In 2014, the city’s overall unemployment rate was 13.5 per cent in 2014 as 
compared to 10.2 per cent in the region and 7 per cent UK-wide; but as a proportion of the 
economically active population, it was 7.3 per cent in Hull compared to 5.2 per cent in the 
region and 4.8 per cent nationally in 2016 (NOMIS 2017). In a recent study ranking 64 UK 
cities according to various economic and social criteria, Hull was ranked near the bottom in 
terms of earnings, job seekers allowance, and employment (Centre for Cities 2014). 
Moreover, Hull’s citizenry suffers from chronic inter-generational unemployment, lack of 
skills development, and social exclusion. For example, the percentage of all households in 
Hull classified as ‘workless’ was 23.2 in 2016 compared to 15.3 nationally (NOMIS 2017).5  
Innovation and entrepreneurialism – capacities deemed indicative of successful cities 
– are in short supply in Hull, with many businesses not surviving past three years, and low 
overall business start-up rates (Interview, economic development practitioner, Hull, 2014). 
Although there is plenty of cheap land suitable for economic development in the wider 
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Humber region as well as on brownfield sites in Hull itself, investment returns tend to be low. 
Moreover, despite offering a range of incentives to prospective commercial and industrial 
firms, Hull has in more recent times struggled to attract inward investment (Gibbs et al. 
2001). Importantly, the threat of flooding is a constant concern for potential investors as 
devastating floods occurred in 2007 and 2013. Crucially, the severe 2007 flood prompted 
local officials and politicians to position more prominently climate change issues on the local 
governance agenda (Interviews, Hull, 2014).  
Bremerhaven has also suffered from declining maritime-related industries (e.g. 
shipbuilding and fishing), persistent high unemployment, low skills base, poor educational 
attainment, population decline, geographic remoteness and flooding (Interviews, 
Bremerhaven, 2013-17). The City of Bremerhaven and the City of Bremen, which are 60 
kilometres apart while being connected by the river Weser, are surrounded by the state 
(Land) Lower-Saxony (Niedersachsen), together form the Land Bremen which is the smallest 
of Germany’s 16 Länder. Bremen is one of Germany’s poorest states and receives funds 
through the (horizontal) fiscal equalisation mechanism between the states 
(Länderfinanzausgleich) and (vertically) from the federal government although the richer 
German states (e.g. Bavaria) have started to question the continuation of the existing rules.   
In 1827 Bremen established a harbour for Bremen (‘Bremerhaven’) on the shores of 
the North Sea (the river Weser had silted up). To this day the harbour of Bremerhaven is still 
owned and operated by the City of Bremen leading to occasional tensions between the two 
cities (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2013-17). The closely intertwined political and 
administrative governance structures of the Cities of Bremerhaven and Bremen are complex 
and cannot be assessed in this paper (for more details see e.g. Scherer 2010). Suffice it to 
note that Bremerhaven has a City Parliament (Stadtverordnetenversammlungen) and MPs 
who participate in the joint State Parliament. In Bremerhaven the Magistrat acts as executive 
with responsibility for the implementation of local climate policy measures adopted by the 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung.  
In 2015 Bremerhaven had about 110,000 inhabitants and Bremen approximately 
671,000. The unemployment rate in Bremerhaven was 14.7 per cent in 2015 (more than twice 
the German average unemployment rate) (Statistisches Landesamt 2016). While 
Bremerhaven suffers from a poor external image this is not the case for Bremen (Interviews, 
Bremerhaven and Bremen, 2013-17). Bremerhaven’s population shrank by 10 per cent until 
2005. However, since about 2012 Bremerhaven has reversed moderately the trend of a 
shrinking population (Mederake 2015: 19).  
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In recent years Bremerhaven has attracted significant employers in the research sector 
(e.g. Alfred-Wegener-Institute, Bremerhaven University and Fraunhofer Institute for Wind 
Energy), wind energy industry (e.g. Areva, PowerPlades, RePower and WeserWind6) and 
logistics companies. In 2009 the climate house Bremerhaven 8° East (Klimahaus 
Bremerhaven 8° Ost) opened; it features climate change-related exhibitions and attracts about 
one million visitors annually.  
 
4. Harnessing the green economy: institutions and strategies in Bremerhaven and Hull  
 
Table 1 summarises some similarities and differences between Hull and Bremerhaven 
in respect of key economic, social and environmental indicators, such as population, 
unemployment, and ‘green jobs.’ In terms of growth around the green economy, 
Bremerhaven is arguably ahead of Hull yet both cities have also retained jobs in some 
traditional sectors. In the 1970s, Bremerhaven hosted one of Europe’s largest fishing industry 
with some 300 trawlers and fishing boats. Although employment in the fishing industry has 
since all but collapsed, Bremerhaven still has a large food industry specialising in frozen fish. 
Significant attempts have been made to reduce GHGE from these factories (Interviews, 
officials Bremerhaven, 2014). Several sites in Bremerhaven are devoted to the assembly and 
construction of wind turbines and tripods, and the city is planning the development of an 
offshore terminal (Offshore Terminal Bremerhaven – OTB). However, in late 2015 the 
planning decision in favour of building the OTB was challenged in court by an environmental 
NGO on the grounds that the terminal is apparently economically no longer viable following 
the insolvency of the tripod manufacturer WeserWind in early 2015. This has caused 
considerable uncertainty for the wind energy industry (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2015-17).  
The Bremerhaven Economic Development Company (Bremerhavener Gesellschaft 
für Investitionsförderung und Stadtentwicklung mbH - BIS) promotes economic development 
in Bremerhaven. An environment division was set up within the BIS in 2003 following a 
local boom in the wind energy industry in the early 2000s. The BIS’s efforts to attract green 
technology investment in Bremerhaven initially focused primarily on the offshore wind 
energy industry although it has broadened its focus to the wider green economy following the 
collapse of WeserWind (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2015-17).  
  
Bremerhaven Hull 
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Population (2015) 110,000  (Land Bremen: 
671,000) 
259,000 (Humber region 
921,000) 
Major employers Wind energy industry, port, 
logistics, food industry, 
research (AWI), 
Bremerhaven University 
Chemical industry, port, 
medical supplies, food 
industry, University of Hull 
Unemployment rate (2014) 14.7% (6.7% Germany 
national average) 
13.5% (7% UK national 
average) 
Declining and former 
industrial sectors 
Fishing industry, 
shipbuilding, departure of US 
army 
Fishing industry, docks, food 
industry, shipbuilding 
Major flooding events 1962, 1999, 2006 1953, 2007, 2013, 2016 
Offshore wind turbine and 
tripod manufacturers 
Areva, PowerBlades, 
RePower and WeserWind 
Hull: Siemens, CS Wind 
(Green Port Hull); Paull: 
Siemens 
North Killingholme: Able 
UK Grimsby: Dong, Vestas 
Offshore wind energy 
related research 
institutions 
Fraunhofer Institute for Wind 
Energy; Bremerhaven 
University; Alfred-Wegener-
Institute (AWI) 
University of Hull, Hull 
College Energy and Climate 
Centre 
Direct jobs in offshore wind 
energy industry (2016) 
c.3,000-4,000 Bremerhaven 
in 2014, c. 10,000 in 
Germany in 2014 
Siemens Hull: c. 800 in 2016, 
c. 6,830 in UK in 2013 
 
Table 1: A comparison of selected economic, social and environmental indicators for 
Bremerhaven and Hull (Sources: interviews 2014-17; Statistisches Landesamt 2016; Humber 
LEP 2015; Kingston upon Hull Data Observatory 2017).  
 
As mentioned above, structurally disadvantaged European cities are not immune from 
regulation-induced economic developments on the national and EU level. In Bremerhaven the 
gold rush fever for the offshore wind energy industry cooled when a newly elected federal 
government (made up of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) 
and Social Democratic Party (SPD)) revised the federal renewable energy law (Erneuerbare 
Energie-Gesetz – EEG) in 2014, resulting in changes to the feed-in tariff thus causing 
uncertainty, delayed investment and even job losses in Bremerhaven. The Northern German 
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coastal states, which benefit most from off- and onshore wind energy production teamed up 
to lobby the federal government for continued government support for offshore wind energy; 
these lobbying activities were largely successful leading again to a more stable investment 
climate for offshore wind energy development.   
Bremerhaven has taken measures to adapt to future sea-level rise and shore up sea-
level defences especially around infrastructural assets. However, it has also taken significant 
climate change mitigation measures including the adoption of plans to lower CO2 emissions 
by 40 per cent in 2020 (compared to 1990). Bremerhaven participates in the European Energy 
Award (EEA), which is an energy management and certification system for cities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants, and the municipal Master Plan for Active Climate Policy 
(Masterplan aktive Klimapolitik - MAK) which involves collaboration with the wider region. 
However, severe budget cuts in 2016 have thrown into doubt Bremerhaven’s future 
participation in the EEA (Interview, Bremerhaven, 2016). Bremerhaven has adopted a wide 
range of other climate actions including cycling paths, electrical mobility, hosting a rally for 
electric cars powered by renewable energy, climate-friendly tourism and passive house 
nurseries. 
Besides flood prevention, Hull is also developing governance capacities around the 
green economy while the wider Humber region is repositioning itself to be the UK's 
‘renewable energy capital.’ One of the main triggers of this transformation has been the 
prospect of developing the renewable energy sector around the estuary. Most notably this has 
involved a new Green Port facility in Hull for the manufacture of offshore wind turbines. In 
2011, in association with the prospect of significant investment by Siemens, the £210m 
Green Port Hull project was proposed as a major new facility to be managed by Associated 
British Ports. In March 2014, Siemens announced its decision to invest £160 million in wind 
turbine production and installation and a new blade manufacturing facility closer to the 
mouth of the Humber Estuary.7  Despite concerns about the long-term impact of Brexit on 
inward investment, in 2015 Siemens commenced its hiring of local trainees to work on the 
production of wind turbines at its Hull facility.  
Motivated by the achievement of attracting Siemens to Hull, local economic 
development practitioners have seen an opportunity to address the City’s longstanding 
structural disadvantages. In 2012, Hull adopted a 10-year City Plan to attract £1bn in 
investment and generate ‘green collar jobs’ through a ‘major economic refit’ including 
exploiting opportunities in the renewable energy sector. As a central component of this, 
Energy City Hull was initiated by the City Council to connect organisations “to work together 
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to take advantage of a changing social and political landscape to accelerate change in the city. 
The main aim of the plan is to create up to 8,000 new jobs for local job-seekers over the next 
10 years, which would inject over £200m into the local economy” (Hull City Council 2012a). 
At the same time, the City Council established a Green City Group to develop a “green vision 
for the city” (Hull City Council 2012b). Whilst the Group met on a regular basis between 
2011 and 2012, since then it has not been publicly active.  In 2013 the Mini-Stern Report for 
the Humber identified need for £1.8bn investment in the low carbon economy, while arguing 
for developing new governance capacities for promoting green investments (Gouldson et al. 
2013). 
A key strategic actor in Hull’s proposed economic transformation is the Humber 
Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) which was set up in 2013. The Humber LEP explicitly 
seeks to link climate change with regional economic development. Following the election of 
the Conservative-Liberal coalition government in the UK in 2010, LEPs, which are private-
sector led but with public sector representation, replaced Regional Development Agencies. In 
its Strategic Economic Plan, the Humber LEP emphasises the region’s large estuary and 
associated capacities based on logistics and the ports (Humber LEP 2015). The LEP quickly 
recognised that addressing climate change is essential to the competitiveness of the city and 
region. There are two considerations here: (1) building inward investor confidence; and (2) 
reducing flooding risk. The LEP has also participated in developing the Humber Spatial Plan, 
which grew out of partnership working with several statutory bodies across the region as well 
as environmental organisations and not-for-profits, including nature and conservation 
partnerships (Interview, economic development practitioner, Hull 2014). As one local 
economic development practitioner has argued, the plan is to put “the Humber [at] the centre 
of renewable energy [in the UK] – so that when people think of energy they will think of the 
Humber” (Interview, Hull, 2014). Nevertheless, many businesses and industries in Hull rely 
upon conventional sources of energy, suggesting that efforts to rebrand the City as the UK 
‘renewable energy capital’ were likely to encounter some obstacles, which we now describe.  
 
5. Climate change, the green economy and reimagining the city 
 
So far we have considered how two structurally disadvantaged cities, Hull and 
Bremerhaven, have started to capitalise on investment and economic development 
opportunities around climate change and the green economy. In both cases, distinctive 
strategies have emerged around developing new sectors and attracting inward investment 
14 
 
around renewable energy (especially offshore wind energy). However, it would seem that the 
corresponding governance capacities and institutions are more developed in Bremerhaven 
compared to Hull. In both cities, moreover, these organisational changes within urban 
governance are being driven primarily by regional and national scale governance processes. 
We now consider how these cities are being reimagined, and associated changes in branding 
strategies and external images. Here we see crucial links between climate change, the green 
economy and place imagination; linkages also recognised in the concept of the NEPUD.    
The expanding literature around how cities market themselves has flagged up the 
growing importance of ‘greening’ strategies for place branding and reimagining (Anderssen 
2016; Cidell 2015). Much of this literature has focused on describing various ‘green’ or 
‘carbon neutral’ place promotion strategies initiated by entrepreneurial cities, highlighting 
how such strategies have been adapted and modified as such cities undergo economic and 
social restructuring, even to the point that transforming disused industrial landscapes into 
green spaces has become emblematic of economic prosperity in the post-Fordist industrial 
age (Keil and Graham 1998; Anderberg and Clark 2013). To take one example from this 
literature, Short (1999) talks of how cities undergo different regimes of representation, each 
involving distinct urban brands, slogans, identities, and representations. Playing on the idea 
that cities no longer engage in chasing smokestack industries, Short refers to one such regime 
as ‘Look No More Factories!’ In this representation, the competitive city is one that attracts 
environmentally clean high tech industries and producer services. Moreover, it is a place 
which actively seeks to suppress images of its polluted industrial past through the 
reimagining of vestigial industrial landscapes as green spaces, creating attractive waterfronts 
(devoid of polluting heavy industry), and marketing the city as environmentally friendly. 
If the process of reimagining the city through, for example, the greening of public space 
has reaped economic rewards especially for certain entrepreneurial cities (Jonas and While 
2007), the corresponding efforts in structurally disadvantaged cities requires confronting 
more than just the challenges of transforming the built environment. Far more challenging is 
the relationship between capital flight and loss of jobs and associated identities among the 
local population. Cox and Mair (1988) argue that often it is urban political actors who are 
most dependent upon growth that strive to fill the void in local meaning and signification 
created by the loss of local jobs and livelihoods caused by disinvestment, which is a profound 
challenge in structurally disadvantaged cities. Typically, new urban imaginaries emerge not 
so much from the local population as from new alliances and coalitions forged between local 
business interests and urban government as these actors, in turn, strive to attract new 
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investments into the locality. However, fostering new urban imaginaries can be a source of 
tension with local communities as different visions and ideas of place and community are up 
for grabs. For instance, Hesse (2015) distinguishes between local economic development 
strategies that promote progressive ideologies and visions of urban and regional growth based 
around, for instance, high technology industry and logistics, and other strategies that draw on 
alternative meanings and ideologies, such as sustainability and community empowerment. In 
the former category, one can refer to the place promotion efforts of cities and states involved 
in selling and promoting regional hubs or national logistic centres. In the latter, we can refer 
to the recent experiences of places like Hull and Bremerhaven.   
Of the two cities discussed here, Bremerhaven has arguably gone further than Hull to 
exploit the opportunities created by climate change and the green economy for reimaging the 
city. Indeed, Bremerhaven is rebranding itself as Klimastadt while also adopting significant 
climate change policy measures. However, it is important to note that this rebranding is 
occurring in a regional context where discussions and debates are ongoing at the state 
(Bremen) level about where to prioritise infrastructure and urban development investment 
especially around ports and logistics. Following a conceptual feasibility study conducted in 
2008-9 (AWI 2009) and long drawn out discussions about financial support, the Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven – officially called Course Climate City Bremerhaven (Kurs Klimastadt 
Bremerhaven) thus illustrating that it is an ongoing goal rather than a final destination – was 
eventually established in 2011 with 50 per cent of its funding each coming from the BIS and 
the Senate Bremen. Its main aim has been to assist in changing Bremerhaven’s image from 
‘fish town’ to ‘climate city’ while involving not only businesses and scientific research 
institutes but also civil society (Interviews, Bremerhaven 2014-17; Mederake 2015). The 
climate city fosters involvement by theatres, schools and young people by, for example, 
organising a Youth Climate Council (Jugendklimarat) with its own budget and access to 
Environment Committee meetings of the City Parliament. A Klimastadt office which 
combines the functions of climate governance administration and general public advice on 
climate-related issues opened in the city centre in November 2014.  
Crucially the initial conceptual study Klimastadt Bremerhaven (AWI 2009) which had 
been commissioned under a grand coalition8 (CDU/CSU-SPD) government in the City 
Parliament did not yet emphasise the involvement of civil society. Instead it focused almost 
exclusively on businesses and research institutes (Interview, Bremerhaven 2015).  It was only 
when a SPD-Green Party coalition government gained a majority in Bremerhaven’s City 
Parliament in 2011 that the Green Party Environmental Councillor insisted on the inclusion 
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of civil society actors in the Klimastadt project thus necessitating a revision of the original 
concept (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2014-17). However, the active inclusion of civil society 
actors in the Klimastadt project seems to have made the project less attractive for businesses 
whose levels of commitment have remained moderate (Interviews, business representative, 
2015-16). Although the possible closure of the Climate City Office in the city centre, which 
was had been discussed in 2016 within the context of the need to make severe budget cuts, 
has been averted, the Climate City Office lost one senior part-time member of staff and had 
to move to a less central location in 2017 (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2017). 
Bremerhaven hosted ‘Climate City Day’ on June 15, 2013, with the slogan ‘we come to 
the people.’ Activities included rent-a-bike, ‘fish and ships’ trips around the harbour, and an 
energy efficiency table. Schools, the local theatre and artists have also been involved in 
climate change-related activities. The city theatre staged a transdisciplinary festival called 
‘Odyssey: Climate’ (Odyssee Klima) which featured climate change related plays and short 
performances by actors and scientists in Bremerhaven’s pedestrianised city centre and in 
some wind turbine assembly factories (Interviews, Bremerhaven, 2015-17). Clearly such 
climate change related activities go well beyond what has conventionally been defined as the 
(local) green economy.  
In Bremerhaven climate change has been used not only to create economic 
opportunities for business, employment for scientific researchers but also openings for artists 
to showcase their creativity and for citizens to get actively involved. It is too early to say 
anything about the long term sustainability of such a wide range of climate change related 
activities. However, the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project has clearly enabled “the 
municipality to increase its sphere of (political) influence and its scope of action” (Mederake 
2015: 384). In other words, the Klimastadt Bremerhaven project has allowed local officials 
and politicians to widen their room for manoeuvre on climate change-related initiatives in 
economic difficult times while engaging with businesses and researchers as well as civil 
society actors.     
Unlike Bremerhaven, which has actively used the ‘climate city’ theme as a rebranding 
strategy, in Hull the story is more complicated and, if anything, a source of stronger ongoing 
tensions and contradictions. One important reason for it is that Hull still relies heavily on 
carbon-intensive industries (e.g. chemicals) for local jobs. Furthermore, wind turbine 
production in Hull is only a fledgling industry while Hull’s City Council has adopted less 
ambitious local GHGE targets when compared to Bremerhaven. Whilst major actors in Hull 
are starting to see opportunities in maritime heritage and the green economy as vehicles for 
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overcoming negative images of the city, only in recent years has this started to cohere around 
a coordinated strategy. Thus there are increasing references to opportunities for the city to 
reconnect with its maritime past, to make the most of its natural assets and, especially, the 
estuary, to invest in more resilient infrastructure, to use Siemens and Green Port Hull as 
catalysts to develop the renewable economy, and most recently to capitalise on the city’s 
successful bid to be UK City of Culture 2017.  
Many of our interviewees argued that there is a “once in a generation opportunity” for 
Hull to make real change (Interviews, Hull, 2014-15). In order to meet the climate change 
challenge, limited changes have been made to governance structures, notably the creation of a 
city leadership board including inputs from across the local authority and stakeholders. Hull 
City Council is supportive of the new investments in Green Port Hull but mainly in order to 
realise the employment potentials. If it did not seem apparent that climate change had the 
potential to create ‘green jobs,’ then there would not be so much investment of time and 
money in developing the green economy along such lines. 
One of the net effects of all of this has been a more focussed effort to talk up Hull and 
the Humber as the ‘renewable energy capital’ of the UK, something which has emerged out 
of previous initiatives to impose a stronger sense of economic identity on the region in the 
absence of any clear alternatives based in Hull and the wider Humber region. The problem is 
that... 
“... there was no ‘Humber’ identity, [even though] there had been previous organisations. 
There had been a Humber Trade Zone, Humber Forum, Humber Economic Partnership 
and all of those had gone and there was a gap of about nine months before the LEP came 
along ... and the LEP was the only Humber entity apart from police and fire of any 
significance at that time.” (Interview, economic development practitioner, Hull, 2014)  
This message has come to be expressed more widely, especially by those organisations and 
political actors charged with providing a stronger voice for the region nationally (see e.g. 
Hughes 2015). As Karl Turner (Labour), the MP for Hull East has argued “Hull is well 
placed to be the renewables capital of the UK. This exciting opportunity guarantees jobs, 
helps the environment and will boost Hull’s economy for future generations” (quoted in 
Marsh 2012). Nonetheless, although welcoming the prospect of inward investment, some 
local business leaders have publicly expressed a concern that “concentrating too heavily on 
only certain, high-profile projects, such as offshore wind, would not allow the region to 
properly flourish and become a true leader in green energy” (Offshore Wind 2012). 
Furthermore: 
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“In one sense it is very important a company like Siemens is a magnet for other 
companies as well because ... we are seeing investment on the back of that. [Yet] in 
another sense it can be a bit of a false thing to hope for because with some investors 
they will come in and [invest in a] factory and employ some people, but it may not be 
local people in the end.” (Interview, economic development practitioner, Hull, 2014) 
Thus for some in Hull the sustainability of the green economy remains in doubt so long as 
more fundamental measures to address the city’s structural problems are not undertaken. 
 Whilst the city has embarked upon community-led regeneration initiatives, the 
prospect of the UK leaving the EU does not bode well for both the long-term future of EU 
funding in Hull and the feasibility of wind energy industry exports to the EU post-Brexit, 
although this will depend on the future trading relationship which the UK will strike with the 
EU and its member states. In this context, ongoing efforts to promote the Hull as a ‘city of 
culture’ resonate quite well with the interests, aspirations and concerns of local communities 
and political leaders in Hull, arguably more so than the corresponding efforts to represent the 
city as a leader on climate change and renewable energy. Nonetheless, there have been 
symbolic attempts to bring these potentially competing strategies closer together, such as the 
decision in early 2017 to place a temporary artwork in the city centre of Hull in the form of a 
giant wind turbine blade – the blade had been manufactured at Siemens’ Green Port Hull 
factory.   
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Drawing upon case studies of Hull and Bremerhaven, this paper has used theoretical 
insights from the literature on urban sustainability and environmental governance in order to 
examine how climate change has worked its way into the political, social and economic 
fabric of two structurally disadvantaged cities. Such cities can be characterised as places that 
have experienced long-term decline in traditional industrial sectors, state-imposed austerity 
measures, and negative external images. Although as a consequence facing deeply-
entrenched social, economic and cultural challenges, both cities have in more recent years 
embarked on ambitious strategies around green economic development and place marketing 
which (at least in Bremerhaven’s case) go well beyond received knowledge based on the 
concept of the NEPUD. We now conclude by reflecting upon how this comparative study 
offers some more general insights into the workings of environmental and sustainability 
governance in structurally disadvantaged cities.  
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The first general finding is that international and national policies on climate change 
seem to provide selective opportunities for local political actors in structurally disadvantaged 
cities to build new alliances across local government, business and civil society in order to 
attract ‘green jobs.’ However, such opportunities are place-specific and depend on the 
presence of contingent factors such as, in the cases examined here, access to port and 
manufacturing facilities suitable for developing off-shore wind farm production. The 
experiences of Hull and, although arguably to a lesser degree, Bremerhaven appear to 
confirm the argument that in times of austerity urban leaders tend to shun broader social and 
environmental objectives in favour of cost-effective short-term measures and interventions 
that focus on jobs and investment rather than long-term social, political and environmental 
transformations (Jonas et al. 2011).  
Nevertheless, secondly our research seems to confirm claims in the NEPUD literature 
that climate change and carbon emissions policies are transforming urban political discourses 
and ushering in new ways of legitimating the costs and benefits of major economic 
development projects such as green port facilities. Structurally disadvantaged cities like Hull 
and Bremerhaven might not be entrepreneurial in a narrowly economic sense but nonetheless 
do exhibit innovative policies and strategies not just in terms of how to deal with the 
challenges of climate change for local economic development but also in terms of the 
involvement of civil society actors around the green economy, broadly defined. In fact, the 
examples examined in this paper demonstrate the resilience of certain cities faced with 
profound structural disadvantages. Hitherto, climate resilience has been associated with 
physical planning interventions that protect key urban assets from sea-level rise, such as 
strategic infrastructure and commercial property, rather than address wider social and 
economic challenges (see e.g. MacKinnon and Derickson 2012). Yet the structurally 
disadvantaged cities examined here appear to be developing governance capacities which 
extend into spheres of economy and civic life well beyond what is conventionally regarded as 
‘climate resilient.’  
Thirdly, policies on climate change and green economic development also provide 
opportunities for certain structurally disadvantaged cities to nurture a more positive external 
image (or, at the very least, to overcome some negative social stereotypes with which they 
may be associated). Both our examples demonstrate how securing investment in the green 
economy requires forward thinking and planning with respect to urban place promotion: it 
forces urban political actors imagine alternative urban futures, which build on existing 
economic assets and cultural resources whilst also developing new institutions and place 
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identities. To some degree this is an extension and modification of what scholars like Short 
(1999) predict in that vestigial and decayed industrial landscapes not only can be reimagined 
in new ways for consumption but also can be socially transformed around arguably more 
environmentally beneficial forms of production.  
Finally, this paper contributes to wider discussions about the changing forms of urban 
sustainability and environmental governance. Previous studies of the NEPUD might have 
underestimated the depth and scope of social and environmental constraints and challenges 
faced by different kinds of cities resulting from their historic role in wider spatial divisions of 
production and consumption. Our focus has been on two structurally disadvantaged cities 
where, despite significant economic, social and political challenges, quite substantive 
progress has been made on developing the local green economy, addressing climate change, 
and transforming the external image of both places.  The wider literature on urban 
sustainability and environmental governance likewise could benefit from the analysis of a 
larger sample of structurally disadvantaged cities. Here we endorse recent calls for further 
comparative research on groups of cities which tend to get overlooked in mainstream urban 
theory and research (Robinson 2011); places, in other words, that are often deemed peripheral 
both geographically and also in terms of how they help to inform wider theoretical ideas and 
concepts. More specifically, we suggest that the concept of ‘structurally disadvantaged cities’ 
helps to expand our understanding of how climate change and the green economy work 
through certain kinds of cities having broadly similar economic, social and cultural 
characteristics.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  The research draws upon more than 40 interviews conducted with officials, researchers 
and stakeholders in Hull, Bremerhaven, Bremen, and Berlin between 2013 and February 
2017. In addition, workshops were held with practitioners in Bremerhaven and Hull in 2013 
and 2014.  
2.  This paper is not the place to assess the inter-linkages between the various scales of 
climate change governance in Europe. Rather it examines the challenges and opportunities 
that climate change and the green economy provide to structurally disadvantaged cities 
which, however, are influenced by climate change policies agreed at ‘higher’ levels of 
governance.  
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3.  Like most environmental treaties, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement are 
signed and ratified as so-called mixed agreements by both the EU and its member states 
including the UK. At the time of writing, the USA had indicated its intention to withdraw 
from the 2015 Paris Agreement. In 2001, the USA abandoned the Kyoto Protocol without 
causing any major impact on the remaining signatories which ratified and implemented the 
protocol.  
4.  German local governments once owned public utilities through Stadtwerke that provided 
energy and water to local customers. However, many Stadtwerke have been privatised due to 
the German federal government’s support the liberalisation of utilities within a Single 
European Market, austerity measures and the constitutional goal of balanced budgets. 
5.  In the 2016 referendum on the UK’s future membership of the EU, more than twice as 
many voters in Hull voted to leave the EU as those who voted to remain. Voter turnout in the 
city was c. 63 per cent. 
6.  WeserWind became insolvent in early 2015.   
7.  However, plans for the additional facility in the East Riding were subsequently shelved.  
8.  In Germany grand coalitions are made up of the two largest political parties represented in 
parliament. 
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